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Abstract: This study uses a firm-level panel data set from Romania to examine whether the nationality of foreign 
investors affects the degree of vertical spillovers from FDI. Investors’ country of origin may matter for spillovers to 
domestic producers in upstream sectors (supplying intermediate inputs) in two ways. First, the share of intermediate 
inputs sourced by multinationals from a host country is likely to increase with the distance between the host and the 
source economy. Second, the sourcing pattern is likely to be affected by preferential trade agreements that cover 
some but not other source economies. In our case, the Association Agreements signed between Romania and the EU 
implies that inputs sourced from the EU are subject to a lower tariff than inputs sourced from the US or Asia. 
Moreover, while for European investors intermediate inputs sourced from home country suppliers comply with the 
rules of origin and thus can be exported to the EU on preferential terms, this would not be the case for home country 
suppliers of American or Asian multinationals. Therefore, we would expect that American and Asian investors 
source more from Romania than EU investors and thus present greater potential for vertical spillovers. The empirical 
analysis produces evidence in support of our hypothesis.  We find a positive association between presence of 
American and Asian companies in downstream sectors and the productivity of Romanian firms in the supplying 
industries. Further, the productivity of Romanian firms in the supplying sectors is negatively correlated with 
operations of European investors in downstream sectors.  The differences between the effects associated with 
investors of different origin are statistically significant. 
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Many countries strive to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering ever more 
generous incentive packages and justifying their actions with the expected knowledge 
externalities to be generated by foreign affiliates. Despite being hugely important to public 
policy, there is little conclusive evidence to support this claim, as the empirical literature 
searching for spillovers operating within sectors has produced mixed results.
1 The picture is 
more optimistic in the case of inter-industry or vertical spillovers taking place through contacts 
between domestic firms and their multinational customers operating in the same country.   
Blalock and Gertler (2004), Javorcik (2004), and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2003) provide 
evidence consistent with the presence of positive FDI spillovers working through this channel.  
Little is known, however, about factors affecting such spillovers.  
This is the first paper to examine factors driving the degree of vertical spillovers from 
FDI.  Using a comprehensive data set of firms operating in Romania, this study tests whether 
there exists a difference in the magnitude of vertical spillovers associated with multinationals 
from different regions of the world (Europe, America and Asia).  We believe that such difference 
are likely to exist for three reasons.  First, as the theoretical models of vertical linkages predict, 
the share of intermediate inputs sourced by multinationals in a host country is positively 
correlated with the distance between the headquarters and the production plant in the host 
country (Rodrigues-Clare, 1996 and Markusen and Venables, 1999).
2  And a larger share of local 
sourcing implies more contacts between multinationals and local firms in upstream sector and a 
greater potential for knowledge spillovers.
3  Therefore, we would expect a higher degree of 
                                                 
1 Most of the existing firm level studies, including Haddad and Harrison (1993) on Morocco, Aitken and Harrison 
(1999) on Venezuela, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on the Czech Republic, and Konings (2001) on Bulgaria, 
Poland and Romania cast doubt on the existence of horizontal (i.e., intra-industry) spillovers from FDI in developing 
countries. They either fail to find a significant effect or produce the evidence of negative impact the presence of 
multinational corporations has on domestic firms in the same sector.  The few studies finding evidence of positive 
within-sector spillovers focus on developed countries (e.g., Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter, 2002, on the UK).  
2 This prediction is confirmed by empirical evidence.  Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2003) demonstrate that sales 
of intermediate inputs by U.S. multinationals to their overseas affiliates decline with the trade costs.  Local sourcing 
by Japanese investors in the United States has been reported to serve operational needs given transportation distance 
and potential shipping delays from Japan (Chung et al., 2003 and Martin and Swaminathan, 1995). In a recent 
survey of multinationals operating in the Czech Republic, when asked "Why did you choose to source inputs from a 
Czech supplier?" over half of the respondents mentioned the importance of proximity to suppliers and the savings on 
transportation costs (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2004). 
3 See Pack and Saggi (2001) and Lin and Saggi (2004) for models of vertical technology transfer from 
multinationals to local suppliers.   3
vertical spillovers to be associated with American and Asian investors than with European 
multinationals, since home countries of the former are located much farther away from Romania. 
Second, preferential trade agreements, which cover some but not all investors’ home 
countries, are likely to affect the sourcing patterns of multinationals. For example, since 
Romania signed the Association Agreements with the European Union (EU), its tariffs on 
imports from the EU and United States are sharply different. During 1999, the average tariff 
applied by Romania on manufacturing imports from the US and Japan was 15.78 percent 
whereas the corresponding tariff on imports from the EU was only 4.88 percent.
4 
Third, multinationals using Romania as the export platform can enjoy preferential (or 
even duty-free) access to EU provided a sufficient share of value in their product was added 
within the area covered by the agreement. This implies that while for European investors 
intermediate inputs purchased from home country suppliers would still comply with the rules of 
origin, this would not be the case for home country suppliers of American or Asian 
multinationals.  Therefore, we expect that American and Asian investors would have a greater 
incentive to source locally and thus would be associated with greater knowledge spillovers to 
Romanian firms in the supplying sectors.
5 ,6  
    Several cases studies from the automotive industry suggest that investor nationality 
may indeed affect the extent of local sourcing. For instance, UNCTAD (2001, p. 166) reports 
that in the case of Suzuki's investment in Hungary rules of origin under the Association 
Agreement with the EU were a factor in the firm's decision to locate there, create local linkages 
and increase local value added, so as to enjoy duty-free access for car exports to EU markets. 
Similarly, Daewoo, which invested in Romania, stated that it intended to reach a 60 percent 
localization level of the production. In 1997, 16.9 percent of the components of Daewoo's Cielo 
                                                 
4 Source: WITS database. The figures in the text refer to simple averages which were calculated based on the tariff 
data for 8- (for EU) or 6-digit (for US and Asia) HS categories. Manufacturing sectors are defined as HS 25-97. 
5 Of course, this will not be true of all American or Asian investors as many of them may still choose to import their 
inputs from countries covered by the Agreement.  Nevertheless, we would expect to observe a broad trend following 
this pattern.  Similarly, a certain number of European investors are likely to engage in local sourcing.  Overall, 
however, we would expect that importing intermediate inputs would be more advantageous to European than to 
other multinationals as European multinationals can combine sourcing for their headquarters, Romanian plants and 
possibly sister companies in Europe in order to enjoy volume discounts.   It has been pointed out that centralized or 
pooled group-sourcing arrangements may encourage affiliates to use foreign sources even when local suppliers are 
available (see UNCTC 2001, p. 136). 
6 Note that preferential trade agreements may also alter the incentives for investment. Lured by low wages and 
guaranteed access to European Union market, foreign investment in the auto industry in Central European countries 
has soared in recent years. For example, the South Korean Hyundai group is expected to build a $850 m Kia plant in 
Slovakia (The Economist, March 6th-12th 2004).   4
model were produced in Romania, and these 300 Romanian components were supplied by 43 
Romanian companies. In the same year, about 40 percent of Cielos produced in Romania were 
exported, mainly to other Eastern European countries which signed the Association Agreements 
with the EU. On the other hand, when the French multinational, Renault, purchased an equity 
stake in Dacia, the Romanian car maker, in 1999, it promised to continue sourcing inputs from 
local suppliers provided they lived up to its expectations. This, however, does not seem to have 
been the case. In 2002, eleven foreign suppliers of the French group were expected to start 
operating in Romania, thus replacing the Romanian producers from whom Dacia used to source 
(Ziarul Financiar (Financial Newspaper) April 19, 2001). 
    The low propensity of European investors to source intermediate inputs from Romania 
may actually hurt domestic firms in upstream sectors. The entry of foreign investors is likely to 
increase the level of competition in downstream industries driving weaker firms out of business.  
As they exit, part of their market share may be acquired by European multinationals, resulting in 
lower demand for domestically produced intermediate inputs. Moreover, European investors 
entering Romania through acquisitions of local firms are likely to sever existing linkages to local 
suppliers again lowering the demand for domestically produced intermediates. A drop in demand 
for intermediates, on the other hand, will force producers in the supplying sectors to spread their 
fixed cost over a smaller market share and thus will lower their productivity. 
Our hypothesis is tested using data from the Amadeus database which includes 
information on 50,597 firms operating in Romania. Over 11 percent of these firms are foreign 
owned with 4,856 firms being affiliates of European companies, 434 of American and 406 of 
Asian corporations.  We estimate a production function controlling for the share of output in a 
given industry coming from foreign owned entities (a proxy for intra-industry spillovers from 
FDI) and for the foreign presence in downstream sectors (potential buyers of intermediate 
inputs). The latter measure is calculated separately for European, American and Asian owned 
companies.   
Our results can be summarized as follows.  We find a statistically significant and positive 
association between the presence of American and Asian companies in downstream sectors and 
the productivity of Romanian firms in the supplying industries. At the same time, the 
productivity of Romanian firms in the supplying sectors is negatively correlated with operations 
of European investors in downstream industries. The differences between the effects stemming   5
from investors of different origin are statistically significant.  The findings are robust to 
controlling for firm-specific fixed effects.  Moreover, the results do not change after we 
implement the Olley and Pakes (1996) correction for endogeneity of input selection.   
We conclude that the observed pattern is consistent with our hypothesis that FDI inflows 
from far away source countries which are not part of the preferential trade agreement are more 
likely to be associated with local sourcing and thus vertical productivity spillovers taking place 
through contacts with local suppliers of intermediate inputs. 
This paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we discuss FDI inflows into 
Romania.  Then we present our data, estimation strategy and the empirical results.  The last 
section concludes. 
 
FDI in Romania  
Compared to Central and Eastern European countries Romania was a late bloomer as an 
FDI destination in the region. The Romanian government's cautious approach to privatization 
and to transition in general had led to relatively slow FDI inflows during the early 1990s. The 
situation changed dramatically in 1997 when substantial privatization efforts along with changes 
in the legislative framework provided new opportunities for foreign investors. As a result, the 
volume of FDI inflows in 1997 and 1998 was thirteen and twenty-one times larger, respectively, 
than the amount received in 1993 (see Table 1). In the following two years a slowdown was 
registered as FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP decreased from 4.9 percent in 1998 to 3.0 
percent in 1999 and 2.8 percent in 2000. Nevertheless, the total FDI stock accumulated between 
1993 and 2000, equal to 6,429 million dollars, made Romania the fourth largest FDI recipient 
among ten countries in the region. 
According to the UNCTAD's Inward FDI performance index, Romania success in 
attracting FDI was also particularly visible in 1997 and 1998. The index is computed as the ratio 
of a country's share in global FDI flows to its share in the global GDP. Countries with an index 
value of one are FDI recipients in line with their relative GDP, while those with an index above 
one attract more FDI than what would be expected given their economic size. In 1996 the index 
value for Romania was 0.58 increasing to above 2 in 1997-98 and then declining to 0.82 and 0.59 
in the two following years (UNCTAD, 2001).   6
At the end of 2000, there were 77,241 companies with foreign capital in Romania, which 
represented about 9 percent of all companies registered in the country.
7 
Foreign companies played an important role in the Romanian economy accounting for 
two-fifths of sales and exports. FDI is mainly concentrated in labor intensive industries and have 
been primarily export-driven (Dumitriu and Hunya, 2002, Voinea, 2002).  About 45 percent of 
FDI stock in 2000 was concentrated in manufacturing industries, with the rest found mainly in 
trade and financial services (Hunya, 2002). 
In terms of the distribution of FDI by the source country, at the end of 2000 61 percent of 
the FDI stock was accounted for by investors from the European Union, 10 percent by the Asian 
capital and 8 percent by American investors (Hunya, 2002). The largest source countries 





The data used in this study come from a commercial database Amadeus compiled by 
Bureau van Dijk, which contains comprehensive information on companies operating in 35 
European countries, including Romania. The Amadeus database covers 387,357 out of 783,969 
(308,064 reported active) firms registered in Romania at the end of year 2000.
9 The difference 
comes from the fact that while Amadeus includes some inactive companies, it does not cover 
state owned firms or co-operatives.  Information on the firms included in Amadeus comes from 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Romania.  
In addition to the standard financial statements, Amadeus includes detailed information 
about the ownership structure of firms which allows us to determine the amount and the country 
of origin of the foreign equity stake in each company.  While having information on the foreign 
equity share is not difficult to find, knowing the source country of the foreign capital is a unique 
feature of our data set.  The database contains only the latest available ownership information 
                                                 
7 http://www.factbook.ro/countryreports/ro/Ro_InvestmentClimate.htm 
8 Ibid. 
9 Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook (2001).   7
(mostly for 2000 and 1999) and no historical figures.
10  For this reason, we limit our analysis to 
an unbalanced panel spanning the period 1998-2000.  We assume that firms which were foreign-
owned in the year for which we have the ownership information were foreign-owned during the 
whole three-year period.   
The sample includes firms with more than five employees in 1999.  After deleting 
inactive firms and missing observations and removing outliers,
11 we are left with 50,597 firms 
(or 131,396 firm-year observations, between 42,246 and 50,597 observations per year).  For 
5,696 firms the foreign capital share exceeds 10 percent of the total.  
We also employ the input-output matrix provided by the Statistical Institute of Romania 
for the first year covered by the sample 1998.
12  The input-output matrix covers 105 sectors and 
each firm in our dataset is matched with the IO sector classification based on its primary three-
digit NACE code.
13  Both manufacturing and service sectors (87 in total) are represented in our 
sample.  A detailed sectoral distribution of firms is presented in Table 2.   As summary statistics 
presented in Table 3 indicate, a large degree of heterogeneity is found in the case of outputs, 
inputs and ownership type. 
 
Empirical Strategy  
Model and Estimation Issues 
To examine the effect of foreign presence on the productivity of domestic firms, we 
estimate a log-linear transformation of a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
ln VAit = lnYit - lnMit = αi  + β1lnKit + β2lnLit + β3Vertical_Europeanjt + β4Vertical_Americanjt + 
β5Vertical_Asianjt + β6Horizontaljt + αt + εijt     (1) 
 
                                                 
10 Despite this shortcoming many researchers studying European economies have employed the Amadeus data.  See, 
for instance, Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2002), Castellani and Zanfei (2001), Konings and Murphy (2001), 
Konings, Rizov and Vandenbussche (2003), Schoors and van der Tol (2001). 
11 Firms in the top and bottom one percentile of all the firm-specific output and input variables were deleted from 
the sample. 
12  Ideally we would like to use multiple input-output matrices since relationships between sectors may change over 
the years or with FDI inflows, albeit radical changes are unlikely.  Unfortunately, input-output matrices for later 
years are not available. 
13 For the concordances between the IO industry codes and three digits NACE codes see Javorcik and Spatareanu 
(2003).   8
where subscripts i, j and t refer to firm, industry and time, respectively. VAit stands for firm’s 
value added, Yit output, Mit, Kit, Lit and represent production inputs: materials, capital and labor. 
αi and  αt  capture firm and time fixed effects, respectively.  Firm fixed effects control for 
unobserved firm characteristics, such a managerial talent, availability of better infrastructure or 
access to financing, etc., which may affect firm productivity.  We define firm’s output as 
turnover deflated by industry specific producer price indices at the two-digit NACE 
classification. Material inputs are deflated by a weighted average of the producer price indices of 
the supplying sectors. The weights are given by the input-output matrix and represent the 
proportion of inputs sourced from a given sector. We measure labor by the number of 
employees. Capital is proxied by the value of tangible fixed assets deflated using the GDP 
deflator.   
In addition to the standard production function variables, we include measures of foreign 
presence in the same sector (Horizontal) as well as in downstream sectors (Vertical), which are 
defined as follows.  Horizontaljt is the share of an industry j’s output produced by firms with at 
least 10 percent foreign equity, calculated for each of the 87 industries.  Even though the number 
of foreign firms does not change during the sample period, output fluctuates and thus it is a 
sector-specific time-varying variable.  
  The variable Verticaljt is a proxy for the foreign presence in downstream sectors (i.e., 
sectors supplied by the industry to which the firm in question belongs) and thus is intended to 
capture the effect multinational customers from a particular region of origin have on domestic 
suppliers. It is defined in the following way: 
Vertical_Origin jt = Σk αjk Horizontal_Originkt 
where αjk is the proportion of sector j’s output used by sector k taken from the input-output 
matrix.
14 We calculate three separate measures of Vertical for three regions of origin of foreign 
investors: Europe, America and Asia.  In order to do so, each foreign affiliate is assigned to one 
of the three regions in following manner. Europe encompasses investors from all European 
countries (EU members, accession countries and non-members) as well as Turkey.
15  America 
includes both North and South America, but the grouping consists primarily of the U.S. and 
Canadian investors.  Among Asian investors China, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq have the higher number 
                                                 
14 In calculating αjk sector j’s output sold for final consumption was excluded.  
15 We have 342 Turkish investors in the sample.  Turkey has been classified as a European country because of its 
proximity and the fact that since 1995 it has formed a Customs Union with the EU.   9
of projects but in terms of volume the Republic of Korea is the dominant source country. Firms 
with shareholders of multiple origins were dropped from the sample.
16 
 
Table 1A in the Appendix presents the distribution of foreign affiliates in the three groups 
across sectors. Note that it is quite similar across the three groups of investors. The regional 
distribution of the multinationals follow similar patterns for the American and Asian as well as 
the European investors. The summary statistics of all variables are listed in Table 2.  The model 
specified in equation (1) is estimated on the sample of purely Romanian firms, since we are 
primarily interested in the impact of foreign presence on domestic producers.   
We restrict our attention to domestic establishments to avoid a potential bias stemming 
from the fact that foreign investors tend to acquire stakes in large and most successful domestic 
companies (see Djankov and Hoekman, 2000).  We use firm fixed effects estimation in order to 
take into account the unobserved firm characteristics, such a managerial talent, access to 
financing, etc., which may affect firm productivity.  Doing so will allow us to control for time 
invariant determinants of productivity across firms that are also potentially correlated with FDI 
variables.  
Further, we control for the fact that firm’s private knowledge of its productivity 
(unobserved by the econometrician) may affect the input decisions, leading to biased estimates of 
the coefficients on factor shares, and employ the semi-parametric approach to estimating 
production function parameters suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and modified by Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003).
17 This method allows for firm-specific productivity differences that exhibit 
idiosyncratic changes over time and thus addresses the simultaneity bias.  Since our study relies 
on correctly measuring firm productivity, obtaining consistent estimates of the production 
function coefficients is crucial to our analysis.  
 
Results 
First, we present the results from the fixed effect model (without the Olley-Pakes 
correction), which, as evident from Table 3, lend support to our hypothesis.  As anticipated, we 
find that the productivity of domestic firms is positively correlated with the presence of 
                                                 
16 There were 1,335 such firm-year observations. 
17 See Appendix for a detailed description of the method.   10
American and Asian investors in downstream sectors (potential buyers of intermediate inputs). 
Further, consistent with our expectations, the data indicate that operations of European firm in 
sectors purchasing intermediates is negative correlated with the productivity of Romania firms in 
the supplying industries.  All of these effects are statistically significant at the one percent level, 
both when entered individually or together into the estimated equation.  The differences between 
the effects associated with European and Asian as well as European and American investors are 
statistically significant at the one percent level.  Finally, we find evidence of positive spillovers 
working within industries.  
Next we correct for the endogeneity of input selection by applying the Olley-Pakes 
procedure to estimate the total factor productivity (TFP) for each sector separately, and then use 
the TFP estimates as the dependent variable in the regression including spillover proxies.  The 
results, shown in the first two columns of Table 4, are consistent with those obtained from the 
fixed effect model. Again all measures of vertical spillovers bear the expected signs and are 
statistically significant at the one percent level.   
Finally, we correct the standard errors to take into account the fact that the measures of 
potential spillovers are industry specific while the observations in the data set are at the firm 
level. As Moulton (1990) pointed out, failing to make such a correction may lead to a downward 
bias in the estimated errors, thus resulting in a spurious finding of statistical significance for the 
aggregate variable of interest.  We perform the correction by clustering the standard errors for 
firms operating in the same industry in the same year.  The results with this modification are 
presented in the last two columns of Table 4.  As expected, the correction inflated standard errors 
on spillover variables, and caused the coefficients on Vertical_Asian and Horizontal to lose their 
significance.  However, the coefficients on vertical spillover proxies associated with American 
and European FDI remained statistically significant.  Moreover, the difference between the 
magnitudes of the two effects remained statistically significant as well. 
 
Conclusions 
 This study uses a firm-level panel data set from Romania to examine whether nationality 
of foreign investors affects the degree of vertical spillovers from FDI. Foreign investors’ country 
of origin may matter for spillovers to domestic producers in upstream sectors (supplying 
intermediate inputs) in two ways. First, the share of intermediate inputs sourced by   11
multinationals from a host country is likely to increase with the distance between the host and the 
source economy. In turn, a larger share of local sourcing implies more contacts between 
multinationals and local firms in upstream sectors and thus a greater potential for knowledge 
spillovers. Second, preferential trade agreements of which some but not other investors are 
members are also likely to affect the sourcing patterns of foreign affiliates.  In our case, the 
Association Agreements signed between Romania and the EU implies that while for European 
investors intermediate inputs sourced from home country suppliers comply with the rules of 
origin and thus can be exported to the EU on preferential terms, this would not be the case for 
home country suppliers of American or Asian multinationals.   
Given these two effects, we expect that American and Asian investors have a greater 
incentive to source locally than European multinationals and thus are likely to be associated with 
greater knowledge spillovers to Romanian firms in the supplying sectors.  We also anticipate that 
the low propensity of European investors to source from Romania may hurt domestic firms in 
upstream sectors. Entry of foreign investors is likely to increase the level of competition in 
downstream industries driving weaker firms out of business and shifting part of their market 
share to European multinationals, which results in lower demand for domestically produced 
intermediates. Moreover, European investors entering Romania through acquisitions of local 
firms are likely to sever existing linkages to local suppliers again lowering the demand for 
domestically produced intermediates. This drop in demand for intermediates will force producers 
in the supplying sectors to spread their fixed cost over a smaller market share and thus will lower 
their productivity. 
Our empirical analysis produces evidence in support of the above hypothesis.  We find a 
statistically significant and positive association between the presence of American and Asian 
companies in downstream sectors and the productivity of Romanian firms in the supplying 
industries.  The data also indicate that operations of European investors in downstream sectors 
are negatively correlated with the productivity of Romanian firms in the supplying industries.  
The differences between the effects stemming from investors of different origin are statistically 
significant.  We conclude that the observed pattern is consistent with our hypothesis that FDI 
inflows from far away source countries that are not part of the preferential trade agreement are 
more likely to be associated with positive vertical spillovers.  Thus in sum, nationality of foreign 
investors does seem to matter for FDI spillovers.   12
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Table 1.  FDI Inflows into CEEC-10 1993-2000 
 
   FDI inflow (millions of US$) 
   1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1993-2000
 
Poland  1,715 1,875 3,659 4,498 4,908 6,365 7,270 9,342 39,632   
 
Czech Republic  654  878 2,568 1,435 1,286 3,700 6,313 4,583  21,417   
 
Hungary  2,350 1,144 4,519 2,274 2,167 2,037 1,977 1,692 18,159   
 
Romania  94  341  419  263 1,215 2,031 1,041 1,025  6,429   
 
Slovak Republic  199 270 236 351 174 562 354  2,052 4,198   
 
Bulgaria  40 105  90 109 505 537 806  1,002 3,194   
 
Latvia  45 214 180 382 521 357 348 407 2,454   
 
Lithuania  30  31  73 152 355 926 486 379 2,432   
 
Estonia  162 214 201 150 266 581 305 387 2,268   
 
Slovenia  113 128 177 194 375 248 181 181 1,597   
 
       Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (FDI figures) 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
   Variable Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.
              
Domestic firms  Turnover (th. Lei 1995) 117,039 6,671.4  11,187.2
  Value Added (th. Lei 1995)  117,039 2,131.2  5,073.2
  Fixed Assets (th. Lei 1995)  117,039 1,399.7  3,750.6
  Materials (th. Lei 1995)  117,039 4,132.0  7,328.8
 Labor  117,039 20.9  38.2
     
European affiliates  Turnover (th. Lei 1995) 11,962 13,680.0  18,503.1
  Value Added (th. Lei 1995)  11,962 6,474.7  11,023.5
  Fixed Assets (th. Lei 1995)  11,962 3,010.8  5,714.3
  Materials (th. Lei 1995)  11,962 6,492.7  10,478.2
 Labor  11,962 31.8  51.8
     
American affiliates  Turnover (th. Lei 1995) 1,059 14,513.9  18,233.1
  Value Added (th. Lei 1995)  1,059 6,812.7  11,592.6
  Fixed Assets (th. Lei 1995)  1,059 3,299.2  5,992.0
  Materials (th. Lei 1995)  1,059 6,996.0  10,626.1
 Labor  1,059 27.1  41.4
     
Asian affiliates  Turnover (th. Lei 1995)  887 12,661.8  17,750.7
  Value Added (th. Lei 1995)  887 3,702.8  7,674.0
  Fixed Assets (th. Lei 1995)  887 2,070.9  4,415.9
  Materials (th. Lei 1995)  887 8,117.1  11,974.2
 Labor  887 19.5  33.8
     
Spillover variables  Horizontal 132,282 0.170  0.080
 Vertical  European  132,282 0.090  0.050
 Vertical  American  132,282 0.006  0.005
 Vertical  Asian  132,282 0.005  0.003
     
Spillover variables    No. of sectors Mean  Std. Dev.
  Horizontal 87 0.216  0.130
 Vertical  European  87 0.129  0.085
 Vertical  American  87 0.009  0.006
 Vertical  Asian  87 0.005  0.004
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Table 3. Results from Regressions with Firm Fixed Effects 
 
                 
Fixed Assets  0.136*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 
      (0.003)     (0.003)      (0.003)      (0.003)      (0.003) 
Labor  0.629*** 0.629*** 0.631*** 0.629*** 0.630*** 
   (0.007       (0.007)      (0.007)      (0.007)      (0.007) 
       
Vertical European  -0.925***      -1.349***  -1.169*** 
      (0.181)         (0.187)      (0.190) 
Vertical American    9.218***    10.581***  9.968*** 
        (1.158)        (1.207)      (1.212) 
Vertical  Asian      15.878*** 13.959*** 15.109*** 
          (1.914)      (1.924)      (1.936) 
Horizontal      0.517*** 
           (0.096) 
       
Intercept  4.260*** 4.117*** 4.108*** 4.176*** 4.069*** 
      (0.028)     (0.023)      (0.024)      (0.029)      (0.035) 
       
No. of obs.  117,039 117,039 117,039 117,039 117,039 
       
Adjusted R-squared  0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35 
       
Year fixed effects    yes yes yes yes yes 
       
test V European = V American      
F stat      88.42  76.05 
prob>F stat      0.00 0.00 
       
test V European = V Asian      
F stat      63.11  70.77 
prob>F stat      0.00 0.00 
       
test V Asian = V American      
F test      2.01  4.57 
prob>F stat      0.16  0.03 
                 
Robust standard errors in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4. Results from Regressions with Olley-Pakes Correction 
 
                
Vertical European  -1.801*** -1.687***  -1.801** -1.687**
      (0.315)     (0.321)      (0.854)      (0.805)
Vertical American  6.771*** 6.409***  6.771* 6.409* 
      (2.144)     (2.153)      (3.873)      (3.846)
Vertical Asian  9.108*** 9.780***  9.108 9.78 
      (3.297)     (3.323)      (9.313)      (9.148)
Horizontal   0.318**   0.318 
        (0.151)        (0.339)
       
Intercept  3.857*** 3.813*** 3.857***  3.813***
      (0.047)     (0.052)      (0.115)      (0.112)
        
No. of obs.  117,039 117,039  117,039 117,039
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.13 0.13  0.13 0.13 
        
Year fixed effects  yes yes  yes  yes 
Industry fixed effects  yes yes  yes  yes 
Clustering of standard errors                         no  no yes  yes 
        
test V European = V American    
F stat  14.88 13.09  3.71  3.45 
prob>F stat  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.06 
        
test V European = V Asian      
F stat  10.85 11.86  1.46  1.66 
prob>F stat  0.00  0.00  0.23 0.20 
        
test V Asian = V American      
F test  0.32 0.66  0.04 0.09 
prob>F stat  0.57 0.42  0.84 0.76 
                




















Olley and Pakes Procedure 
 
We employ the semi-parametric estimation of the production function parameters 
suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and modified by Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) to account 
for the simultaneity bias.  Productivity can be thought of as having two components, one that is 
random each period  (ηit) and another that is known to the firm but unknown to the 
econometrician (ωit). Firms would thus adjust their inputs based on their anticipation or 
knowledge of the productivity component (ωit), introducing a simultaneity bias.  The insight of 
the method is that the observable characteristics of the firm can be modeled as a monotonic 
function of the productivity of the firm. Inverting such a function allows the modeling of the 
unobserved component of the productivity as a function of the observed variables. While Olley 
and Pakes (1996) use investment to model the unobserved productivity shock we follow 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) approach and use raw materials as the instrument to correct for 
simultaneity bias (as was done by Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2001).  We do so because of the 
lack of reliable information on investment expenditures. 
 
To illustrate the insights of the method, we start with the following production function: 
 
vait = yit - mit = α + βl *lit +βk *kit +ωit + ηit  (2) 
  
where va stands for value added (i.e., output minus material inputs), l labor, k capital, and i and t 
are subscripts denoting firm and time, respectively.  Capital is treated as a state variable while 
labor and materials are assumed to be freely variable inputs. ηit represents the error term 
capturing unpredictable shocks, while ωit is a productivity shock which is unobserved by the 
econometrician but known to the firm. Firms adjust their variable inputs based on their 
anticipation or knowledge of the productivity component (ωit). Since there exists a correlation 
between the error term (ωit + ηit) and the explanatory variables, a simple OLS procedure leads to 
inconsistent parameter estimates.    19
As Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) showed, the unobserved productivity can be identified 
from the firms’ observable variable input choices. The chosen variable input is material inputs.
18 
The demand for materials can be modeled as a monotonic function of the capital stock and the 
unobserved (to the econometrician) productivity shock.   
 
mit = f(kit, ωit) 
 
The first advantage of using intermediate inputs is that they generally respond to the entire 
productivity term, while investment may respond only to the ‘news’ in the unobserved term.  
Further, intermediate inputs provide a simpler link between the estimation strategy and the 
economic theory, primarily because they are not typically state variables.  
Assuming the function f(.) is invertible, the unobservable productivity shock can be 
expressed as a function of observable variables  
 
ωit = h(mit ,kit)              (3) 
 
We assume that materials are a variable input whose choice is affected by ωit while capital is 
determined by past values of productivity only. 
Substituting (3) into (2), we get the equation to be estimated in the first stage of the 
procedure: 
 
vait = α + βl *lit +βk *kit +  h(mit ,kit) + ηit  (4) 
 
Note that the functional form of h(.) is not known. Therefore, βk cannot be obtained at this stage.  
We estimate equation (4) using a third order polynomial expansion in capital and materials to 
approximate the unknown form of h(.).  From this stage we obtain the consistent estimate of the 
labor input coefficient as well as the estimate of the third order polynomial in mit and kit , to 
which we refer as ψit 
 
                                                 
18 While Olley and Pakes (1996) use investment to model the unobserved productivity shock, we follow Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2000) approach and use materials as the instrument to correct for simultaneity bias (as was done by 
Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2001).  We do so because of the lack of reliable information on investment expenditures.   20
ψit= βk *kit +  h(mit ,kit) (5)  
 
Thus, h(mit ,kit)= ψit - βk *kit  (6) 
 
We proceed with the second stage where we estimate the effect of capital on output.  Let’s 
consider the expectation of vat+1 - βl *lt+1 conditional on the information at time t. Assuming that 
ωit follows a first order Markov process, one can rewrite ωit+1 as a function of ωit, letting ξit+1 be 
the innovation in ωit+1.   And ωit can be replaced with a function of h(mit,kit). Therefore the 
equation to be estimated in the second stage becomes: 
 
vait+1 - βl *lit+1 =c + βk *kit+1 + g( hit(.)) + ξit+1 + ηit+1  (7) 
 
Since the functional for of g(.) is not known, we use once more the third order polynomial 
expansion (with all interactions). Since the capital in use in a given period is assumed to be 
known at the beginning of the period and ξit+1 is mean independent of all variables known at the 
beginning of the period, ξit+1 is mean independent of kit+1.  The consistent coefficient βk can thus 
be obtained by running non linear least squares on equation (7). 
In summary, following Olley and Pakes(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) we use a semi-
parametric estimator to generate time-varying firm-specific measures of plant productivity that 
are consistent even in the presence of input shares being influenced by the private knowledge of 
firm’s productivity. The above procedure is performed for each sector separately and the 
















                                                 
19 Since the procedure described above calls for using lagged variables, we employ a longer panel 1996-2000 to 
obtain productivity estimates but in the subsequent analysis of spillovers the timeframe is restricted to years 1998-
2000.     21














   percentages 
1  Vegetable production  1.61  0.91  0.69  1.48  1.54
2  Breeding 0.19  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.18
6  Fishing and aquaculture  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05
8  Extraction of petroleum (incl. auxiliary services)  0.88  0.95  0.46  0.25  0.88
9  Extraction of natural gas (incl. auxiliary services)  0.07  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.08
13  Extraction of building material ores  1.47  0.43  0.46  0.00  1.35
14  Extraction of clay and sand  0.10  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.10
15  Extraction and processing of chemical ores  0.03  0.02  0.23  0.00  0.03
16  Extraction and processing of salt  0.18  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.17
18  Meat  production and processing  1.34  1.09  2.07  1.48  1.33
19  Processing and preserving of fish and fish products  0.06  0.02  0.00  0.25  0.06
20  Processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables  0.30  0.45  0.46  0.25  0.31
21  Production of vegetable and animal oil and fat  0.13  0.16  0.23  0.74  0.14
22  Production of milk products  0.65  0.43  0.46  0.49  0.63
23  Production of milling and starch products  1.00  1.07  0.69  0.49  1.00
24  Manufacture of fodder  0.04  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.04
25  Processing of other food products  4.51  4.88  4.38  7.14  4.56
26  Beverages 0.73  1.01  1.38  1.48  0.77
28  Textile industry  3.91  7.31  4.84  2.22  4.23
29  Apparel 0.18  0.29  0.00  0.00  0.19
30  Manufacture of leather and fur clothes  0.07  0.04  0.23  0.00  0.07
31  Footwear and other leather goods  0.84  2.86  0.23  0.99  1.03
32  Wood processing (excluding furniture)  2.60  4.08  1.61  2.46  2.73
33  Pulp, paper and cardboard; related items  0.30  0.84  0.23  0.49  0.35
34  Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media  2.02  2.76  2.07  0.25  2.08
36  Crude oil processing  0.02  0.06  0.23  0.00  0.02
38  Basic chemical products  0.16  0.49  0.00  0.00  0.19
40  Dyes and varnishes  0.13  0.27  0.00  0.00  0.14
41  Medicines and pharmaceutical products 0.20  0.21  0.00 0.74  0.20
42  Soaps, detergents, cosmetics, perfumery  0.12  0.37  0.69  0.99  0.15
43  Other chemical products  0.14  0.10  0.46  0.00  0.13
44  Synthetic and man made fibers  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.01
45  Rubber processing  0.25  0.25  0.46  0.74  0.25
46  Plastic processing  0.60  1.50  1.84  2.22  0.71
47  Glass and glassware  0.24  0.37  0.46  0.00  0.26
48  Processing of ceramics (excl. building items)  0.13  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.14
49  Ceramic boards and flags  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02
50  Brick, tile and other building material processing  0.20  0.25  0.00  0.25  0.20
51  Cement, lime and plaster  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.03
52  Processing of concrete, cement and lime items  0.22  0.27  0.00  0.00  0.22
53  Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone  0.11  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.11
54  Other non-metallic mineral products  0.03  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.04
55  Metallurgy and ferroalloys processing  0.03  0.12  0.23  0.00  0.04
56  Manufacture of tubes  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.02
57  Other metallurgy products  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.02  22
58  Precious metals and other non-ferrous metals  0.04  0.19  0.00  0.00  0.06
59  Foundry 0.14  0.14  0.46  0.00  0.15
60  Metal structures and products  2.23  2.33  1.15  0.49  2.22
61 
Manufacture of equipment for producing and using 
of mechanical power  0.09  0.14  0.69  0.00  0.10
62  Machinery for general use  0.17  0.33  0.23  0.25  0.19
63  Agricultural  and forestry machinery  0.05  0.12  0.00  0.25  0.06
64  Machine tools  0.09  0.25  0.23  0.00  0.10
65  Other machines for special use  0.15  0.37  0.46  0.00  0.17
67  Labor-saving devices and domestic machinery  0.08  0.19  0.23  0.00  0.09
68  Computers and office means  0.21  0.45  1.61  0.99  0.25
69  Electric machinery and appliances  0.31  0.70  0.23  0.25  0.35
70  Radio, TV and communication  equipment   0.12  0.41  0.92  0.74  0.16
71  Medical, precision, optical instruments and apparatus  0.24  0.45  0.69  0.00  0.26
72  Means of road transport  0.20  0.29  0.23  0.25  0.21
73  Naval engineering and repair  0.15  0.12  0.00  0.25  0.15
74  Production and repair of railway transport means   0.04  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.03
77  Furniture 1.22  1.89  1.61  0.99  1.28
78  Other industrial activities  0.42  0.78  0.23  0.25  0.45
79  Electric power production and distribution  0.04  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.04
80  Gas production and distribution  0.01  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.02
81  Production and distribution of thermal energy  0.08  0.02  0.23  0.00  0.08
82  Water collection, treatment and distribution  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.14
83  Construction 9.24  3.50  2.53  1.97  8.57
84  Wholesale and retail  40.21  31.47  34.33  50.49  39.40
85  Hotels 0.70  0.64  0.92  0.25  0.69
86  Restaurants 4.45  1.94  3.23  5.17  4.20
87  Railway transport  0.02  0.10  0.00      0.03
88  Road transport  3.18  4.76  2.07  3.20  3.32
90  Water transport  0.06  0.10  0.00  0.25  0.07
91  Air transport  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.02
92  Auxiliary transport activities and travel agencies  0.25  0.39  0.00  1.72  0.27
93  Tourism agencies and assistance  0.60  1.01  0.92  0.74  0.64
95  Telecommunication 0.47  0.56  3.00  0.00  0.50
97  Real estate activities  0.47  0.60  0.92  0.25  0.48
98  Computer and related activities  0.82  2.00  4.61  0.49  0.97
99  Research and development  0.17  0.12  0.46  0.00  0.17
100  Architecture, engineering and other technical services  1.19  1.01  2.07  0.25  1.17
101  Other business activities  2.51  3.58  6.45  2.22  2.65
102  Public administration and defense, compulsory social assistance 0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03
103  Education 0.31  0.14  0.23  0.00  0.29
104  Health and social work  0.45  0.49  0.92  0.99  0.46
105  Other services (collective, social and personal services)  2.66  3.15  3.00  1.97  2.70
  TOTAL 100  100  100  100  100
 
 
 
 
 